Gildan Media

Companion PDF

BOGLE ON MUTUAL FUNDS


by

John C. Bogle

TABLE 1–1*The Financial Markets* (December 31, 1871, to December 31, 1992)

Annual rate		Final value of \$1
of return		initial investment
Common stocks	+8.8%	\$27,710
Long-term bonds	+4.6	240
Cash reserves	+4.2	140

FIGURE 1–1 Cumulative Returns on U.S. Financial Assets (December 31, 1871, to December 31, 1992)



Part I/Building Blocks




FIGURE 1–2 Common Stock Returns (Decades Ended 1935–92)

While the second expectation suggests that dividends need not always be a critical determinant of the returns on stocks, even when a company does not pay a dividend, investors implicitly value the firm's stock based on the presumption of future dividends. When the earnings of a business are retained each year, investors expect that the earnings will increase over time, resulting in future dividends that will be higher than if they had been distributed currently. In sum, while the consideration of stock returns may encompass any number of qualitative and quantitative factors, any valuation judgment must ultimately rely on dividends and earnings.

Since 1926, the average *annual* total return (taking into account both capital appreciation and dividends) on common stocks has been +10.3%. While it is important to know what to expect from the stock market in the long run, you should also consider how stock returns have varied over different periods. Since this book is addressed to the long-term investor, I use a decade as my standard for analysis. Figure 1–2 shows the annualized total return on common stocks for the average decade during the 67-year period ended December 31, 1992, and for each of the 58 "moving decades" within it (1925–35, 1926–36, continuing through 1982–92).

8

CAVEAT EMPTOR: The Price-Dividend Multiple

My shift from the customary concept of price-earnings multiple to the less familiar price-dividend multiple is based largely on the fact that, especially in recent years, wide gaps have opened up between *reported* corporate earnings and *operating* corporate earnings. The difference between the two is accounted for by write-offs of discontinued operations, write-downs of assets such as real estate, and changes in generally accepted accounting principles. As a result, reported price-earnings multiples have soared and, I would argue, have lost touch with reality. This chart reflects the sharp divergence of price-earnings and price-dividend multiples over the past 15 years. If reported earnings are less than operating earnings in any given year, there are two consequences: (1) the current price-earnings ratio rises and (2) the rate of past earnings growth declines. In 1991, for example, reported earnings on the S&P 500 totaled \$15.97 per share, compared with operating earnings of \$21.61 per share. Thus, the price-earnings ratio was 26.1 times, the highest in the entire period illustrated. If operating earnings were used, a more realistic ratio of 19.3 times would result. Using the reported earnings number results in an annual earnings growth rate of only +0.4% during the decade ended December 31,1991, while operating earnings grew at a rate of +3.5% annually and dividends grew at +6.3% annually. If 1991 were unique, the problem might be ignored, but there were substantial write-offs again in 1992. In the long run, earnings must be generated for dividends to be paid, but the durability of dividends makes them a more solid baseline for analysis.




FIGURE 1–3 Price of \$1 of Dividends (1926–92)




TABLE 1–2Components of Stock Returns

	Golden decade 1981–91	Tin decade 1968–78	Average decade 1926–92
Initial dividend yield	+5.4%	+3.0%	+4.7%
Dividend growth rate	+6.3	+5.1	+4.8
Impact of multiple change	+6.3		+1.0
Average annual total return	+18.0%	+2.5%	+10.5%

FIGURE 1–4 Long-Term Government Bond Returns (Decades Ended 1935–92)




TABLE 1–3 20-Year Government Bond (8% coupon, \$10,000 Initial Investment)

	Reinvestment Rate		
	6%	8%	10%
Value at maturity	\$10,000	\$10,000	\$10,000
Cumulative interest coupon	16,000	16,000	16,000
Reinvestment effect	14,200	22,000	32,300
Total value	\$40,200	\$48,000	\$58,300

TABLE 1–4Components of Bond Returns

	Golden decade 1981–91	Tin decade 1971–81	Average decade 1926–92
Initial yield	+13.3%	+6.0%	+4.5%
Reinvestment rate	-2.6	+2.4	+0.6
Impact of change in rates	+4.9	-5.6	-0.8
Average annual total return	+15.6%	+2.8%	+4.3%

FIGURE 1–5 Price of \$1 of Interest (1926–92)




TABLE 1–5A Shifting Yield Curve

	December 1988		December 1992	
Government bond	Interest rate	Price of \$1 of interest	Interest rate	Price of \$1 of interest
Short-term	9.2%	\$11	5.1%	\$20
Intermediate-term	9.2	11	6.1	16
Long-term	9.2	11	7.3	14




TABLE 1–6U.S. Treasury Bill Returns

	Golden decade	Tin decade	Average decade
	1977–87	1932–42	1926–92
Average annual total return	+9.2%	+0.1%	+3.6%

TABLE 1–7 Capital Accumulations (Annual Rates of Return)

	Initial Investment of \$25,000				
Years invested	4%	6%	8%	10%	12%
1	\$26,000	\$26,500	\$27,000	\$27,500	\$28,000
5	30,400	33,500	36,700	40,300	44,100
10	37,000	44,800	54,000	64,800	77,600
15	45,000	59,900	79,300	104,400	136,800
20	54,800	80,200	116,500	168,200	241,200
25	66,600	107,300	171,200	270,900	425,000
		Annua	al Investment of S	\$1,000	
Years					
invested	4%	6%	8%	10%	12%
1	\$1,040	\$1,060	\$1,080	\$1,100	\$1,120
5	5,600	6,000	6,300	6,700	7,100
10	12,500	14,000	15,600	17,500	19,700
15	20,800	24,700	29,300	35,000	41,800
20	31,000	39,000	49,400	63,000	80,700
25	43,300	58,200	79,000	108,200	149,300

TABLE 2–1*The Financial Markets—Average Annual Total Returns*(December 31, 1871, to December 31, 1992)

	Nominal	Inflation	Real
	return	rate	return
Common stocks	+8.8%	-2.3%	+6.5%
Long-term bonds	+4.6	-2.3	+2.3
Cash reserves	+4.2	-2.3	+1.9

TABLE 2–2 The Financial Markets—Average Annual Total Returns

	Nominal return	Inflation rate	Real return
1872–1925			
Common stocks	+7.0%	-1.2%	+5.8%
Long-term bonds	+4.4	-1.2	+3.2
Cash reserves	+4.7	-1.2	+3.5
1926–92			
Common stocks	+10.3%	-3.1%	+7.2
Long-term bonds	+4.8	-3.1	+1.7
Cash reserves	+3.7	-3.1	+0.6

FIGURE 2–1 Inflation (U.S. Consumer Price Index 1926–92)




FIGURE 2–2 Common Stocks Returns (1926–92)




FIGURE 2–3 Range of Returns on Common Stocks (1926–92)




TABLE 2-4 Dollar-Cost Averaging—Annual Rates of Total Return

	Initial investment of \$10,000	Annual investments of \$1,000
Best decade (1948–1958) Worst decade (1928–1938)	+20.1% -0.9	+19.2% +7.0
Range	21.0%	12.2%

TABLE 2–5\$10,000 Investment—Average Decade: 1926–92

Final value

Principal value Income received	\$17,110 4,700
Total value: no reinvestment	\$21,810
Total value: with reinvestment	\$27,140

FIGURE 2–4 Dividend Growth versus Inflation (1950–92)





FIGURE 2–5 Investment Income—Stocks versus Bonds



Note: 7% bond coupon; 3% initial stock yield and 6% dividend growth rate.

FIGURE 2–6 Long-Term Government Bond Returns (1926–92)




FIGURE 2–7 Range of Returns on Long-Term Government Bonds (1926–92)




TABLE 2–6 Total Return Volatility—One-Day Total Return

Instantaneous rate change	5-year bond (7% coupon)	20-year bond (7% coupon)
+3%	-12%	-26%
+2	- 8	-18
+1	- 4	-10
0	0	0
-1	+ 4	+12
-2	+ 9	+25
-3	+13	+41

TABLE 2–7 Total Return Volatility—Simple Average Returns

Instantaneous rate change	5-year bond (7% coupon)		20-year bond (7% coupon)		
	1 year	5 years	1 year	5 years	20 years
+3%	- 3%	+7%	-18%	+ 2%	+7%
+2	0	+7	-11	+ 3	+7
+1	+ 4	+7	-13	+ 5	+7
0	+ 7	+7	+ 7	+ 7	+7
-1	+11	+7	+18	+ 9	+7
-2	+14	+7	+31	+11	+7
-3	+18	+7	+47	+13	+7

FIGURE 2–8 Value of 7% 20-Year Treasury Bond (When Interest Rates Rise or Fall 2%)




TABLE 2–8 Principal Volatility—Average Annual Capital Return

Instantaneous	5-year bond (7% coupon)		20-year bond (7% coupon)		
rate change	Instantaneous	5 years	Instantaneous	5 years	20 years
+3%	-12%	0%	-26%	-5%	0%
+2	- 8	0	-18	-3	0
+1	- 4	0	-10	-2	0
0	0	0	0	0	0
-1	+ 4	0	+12	+2	0
-2	+ 9	0	+25	+4	0
-3	+13	0	+41	+6	0

FIGURE 2–9 U.S. Treasury Bill Returns (1926–92)




TABLE 2–9 Investment Characteristics of Financial Assets

	Total	Principal	Current	Income	Income
	return	stability	yield	growth	stability
Common stocks	A	C	B	A	B
Long-term bonds	B	B	A	C	A
Cash reserves	C	A	C	NA*	C

*Not applicable; U.S. Treasury bill yields may rise or decline.

TABLE 3–1*Mutual Fund Industry* (December 31, 1992)

	\$ billion	Percent of total	Number of funds
Common Stock Funds			
Growth	\$ 136	9%	361
Value	140	9	290
Equity income	40	2	74
Broad-based specialty	113	7	524
Concentrated specialty	34	2	183
Subtotal	\$ 463	29%	1,432
Bond Funds			
Investment-grade corporate	\$ 57	4%	262
Medium-grade corporate	19	1	74
High-yield corporate	33	2	78
Tax-exempt	198	12	759
Mortgage-backed	94	6	116
U.S. Treasury and government	81	5	272
Global	28	2	101
Subtotal	\$ 510	32%	1,662
Money Market Funds			
Prime paper	\$ 300	19%	363
Treasury and agency	159	10	292
Tax-exempt	96	6	321
Subtotal	\$ 555	35%	976
Balanced Funds			
Traditional	\$ 31	2%	95
Income-oriented	9	1	17
Asset allocation	14	1	85
Subtotal	\$ 54	4%	197
Total Industry	\$ 1,582	100%	4,267


TABLE 3–2 Components of Mutual Fund Returns (15-years ended December 31, 1992)


	Rate of Return			Contribution to Total Return	
	Total return	Capital return	Income return	Capital	Income
Stock funds	+14.6%	+11.4%	+3.2%	78%	22%
Bond funds	+ 8.8	- 0.9	+9.7	-10	110
Money market funds	+ 8.7	0.0	+8.7	0	100
Balanced funds	+13.2	+ 6.0	+7.2	45	55

TABLE 4–1 Growth Funds versus Value Funds (20 Years Ended December 31, 1992)

	Average Annual Rate of Return		
5-year periods (inclusive)	Growth funds	Value funds	
1973–77	- 2.9%	+ 1.7%	
1978–82	+19.1	+15.9	
1983–87	+11.0	+13.5	
1988–92	+14.7	+13.6	
Total period 1973-92	+10.1%	+11.0%	

FIGURE 4–1 Growth Funds versus Value Funds






1973 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

TABLE 4–2Rank of Equity Holdings (December 31, 1992)

	Growth funds	Value funds
Philip Morris	1	1
FNMA	2	5
Merck	3	4
PepsiCo	8	16
Pfizer	11	19
American International Group	13	13
Royal Dutch	16	6
General Electric	18	2
Bristol-Myers Squibb	20	12
IBM	21	7

FIGURE 4–2 Small Cap versus Large Cap Stocks (20 Years Ended December 31, 1992)

Cumulative Returns 1973–92



Ratio of Cumulative Returns 1973-92





TABLE 4–3 Components of Total Return (15 Years Ended December 31, 1992)

Fund type	Income return	Capital return*	Total return	Income as percent of total return
Equity income	+6.2%	+ 7.8%	+14.0%	44%
Value	+4.3	+ 9.4	+13.7	31
Growth	+2.7	+12.9	+15.6	17
Small company	+1.8	+14.3	+16.1	11
Aggressive growth	+1.2	+12.7	+13.9	9

*Includes increases in net asset value plus reinvested capital gains distributions.

FIGURE 4–3 U.S. versus Foreign Markets

Cumulative Returns 1973–92



Ratio of Cumulative Returns 1973-92




TABLE 4-4Yield Comparison

	Value fund A	Growth fund B
Gross yield	4.0%	2.5%
Expenses	2.0	0.5
Net yield	2.0%	2.0%

TABLE 4–5 Portfolio Statistics Analysis (December 31, 1992)

Classification	ExMark	Beta	Gross yield
Growth funds	83%	1.01	2.3%
Value funds	87	0.87	3.7
Equity income funds	87	0.76	5.0
Aggressive growth funds	68	1.19	2.4
Small company funds	69	1.16	1.5
International funds	38	0.65	3.0
Gold funds	0	0.00	2.6
Standard & Poor's 500 Index	100	1.00	2.8

TABLE 4–6Portfolio Statistics Analysis (December 31, 1992)

	ExMark	Beta	Gross yield	Annual return five years ended December 31, 1992
Selected value fund	78%	0.70	4.2%	+13.4%
Peer group average Value fund average	84 87	0.69 0.87	4.4 3.7	+12.7 +13.6
Selected growth fund	91	1.19	1.2	+16.0
Peer group average Growth fund average	90 83	1.13 1.01	1.6 2.3	+16.4 +14.7

TABLE 4–7One-Year Rank Order of Top 20 Equity Funds (1982–92)

First year rank	Average rank in subsequent year	First year rank	Average rank in subsequent year
	100	11	210
1	100	11	310
2	383	12	262
3	231	13	271
4	343	14	207
5	358	15	271
6	239	16	287
7	220	17	332
8	417	18	348
9	242	19	310
10	330	20	226
Average rank of to	p 20 in subsequent year $= 2$	284	
Average number of	f funds = 681		

Concentrated specialty and international funds excluded.

TABLE 4-8Ten-Year Rank Order of Top 20 Equity Funds

Rank 1972–82	Rank 1982–92	Rank 1972–82	Rank 1982–92
1	128	11	222
2	34	12	5
3	148	13	118
4	220	14	228
5	16	15	205
6	2	16	78
7	199	17	209
8	15	18	237
9	177	19	119
10	245	20	242

Number of funds = 309

Concentrated specialty and international funds excluded.

TABLE 4–9Performance of Growth and Value Funds by Quartiles

		1987–92 Ranking				Fiv	e-Year Aver	age
		First quartile	Second quartile	Third quartile	Fourth quartile	Gross return (%)	Expense ratio (%)	Net return (%)
Ranking	First quartile	14	10	12	8	15.9	0.9	15.0
Rar	Second quartile	8	13	11	12	14.8	0.9	13.9
-87	Third quartile	13	12	10	9	15.5	1.0	14.5
-7791	Fourth quartile	9	9	11	15	14.6	1.7	12.9

CAVEAT EMPTOR: Coming Down to Earth

I noted earlier that regression to the mean is a critically important concept for investors to understand. In the stock market, it means that returns substantially above or below long-term norms are likely to subsequently move down, or up, toward the norm. The same principle applies in equity fund performance. The fund shown below exceeded the returns of the stock market by an average of 20 percentage points a year during the first seven years of the selected 14-year period. But it provided an average margin of only three percentage points during the second seven years. While this margin is indeed healthy, the lessening of superiority shown in the example provides a good illustration of a fund's performance "coming down to earth." It is also a reminder that no fund can consistently sustain exceptionally high relative returns.




TABLE 4–10*Honor Roll Analysis (1974–92)*

	Average annual return	Cumulative return	Final value of initial investment of \$10,000
Honor roll funds	+11.2%	+650%	\$75,000
Average equity fund	+12.5	+843	94,300
Total stock market*	+13.1	+936	103,600

*Wilshire 5000 Index

FIGURE 4–4 *Relative Performance of the Honor Roll* (1974–92)




TABLE 5–1 Bond Fund Sectors—Number of Funds (December 31, 1992)

		Investment-	Medium-	High-	Investment-	High-		
<i>U.S.</i>	Mortgage-	grade	grade	yield	grade	yield		
government	backed	corporate	corporate	corporate	municipal	municipal	Global	Total

Short-term	69	52	73	2	_	20	-	48	264
Intermediate-									
term	49	64	64	_	78	41	_	_	296
Long-term	154	-	125	72	-	670	28	53	1,102
Total	272	116	262	74	78	731	28	101	1,662

TABLE 5–3 Bond Fund Yields—Impact of Quality and Expenses (December 31, 1992)

	Short-term corporate bond fund		тип	tional licipal d fund	California municipal bond fund	
	High quality	Medium quality	High quality	Medium quality	High quality	Medium quality
Gross yield Expenses Net yield	$\frac{7.7\%}{-0.3}$	$\frac{7.9\%}{-0.6}$	$\frac{6.7\%}{-0.2}$	$\frac{8.0\%}{-2.1}$	$\frac{6.1\%}{-0.2}$	$\frac{7.2\%}{-1.9^*}$

*Includes expense ratio of 1 4% and 5% sales load amortized over ten years.

TABLE 5-4Price Volatility of Bond Mutual Funds

			Impact of Change in Yield on Net Asset Value					
	December 31, 1992		Higher rate		Lower rate			
Government issue	Maturity	Yield	+2%	+1%	-1%	-2%		
Bills	90 days	3.1%	0%	0%	0%	0%		
Short-term bonds	$2^{1}/_{2}$ years	4.8	- 4	- 2	+ 2	+ 5		
Intermediate-term bonds	10 years	6.7	-13	- 7	+ 7	+16		
GNMAs	9 years	6.8	-11	- 5	+ 4	+ 7		
Long-term bonds	20 years	7.3	-18	-10	+11	+25		

Estimated price changes exclude interest income. GNMA price changes include an estimate of prepayment risk

CAVEAT EMPTOR: Swapping Principal for Income

The intelligent investor must take the trouble to look beyond current yields in evaluating short-term bond funds. Today yields can be enhanced, not only by the traditional steps of reducing quality and lengthening maturity, but also by using derivative instruments and CMOs that provide more income return, usually at the expense of capital return. The table shows two apparently similar AA bond funds, both with average maturities of three years. Fund B, however, generated 26% more gross income than Fund A. Despite an expense ratio more than double that of Fund A, Fund B provided 20% more net income return. In this case, it achieved an illusory advantage by holding 16% positions in both GNMA securities and derivative instruments. As interest rates fell during 1992, the piper was paid and the investor's capital in Fund B was impaired. The total return achieved by the lower-yielding Fund A was 33% higher than that of Fund B. Moral: Yields on short-term bond funds are not always what they seem.

	Fund A	Fund E
Gross income return	+6.9%	+8.7%
Expense ratio	-0.3	-0.8
Net income return	$\frac{-0.3}{+6.6\%}$	+7.9%
Capital return	+0.6	-2.5
Total Return	+7.2%	+5.4%

Short-Term Bond Funds (12 months ended December 31, 1992)

TABLE 5–5 Corporate Bond Funds (Six Years Ended December 31, 1992)

	Average Annual Returns			
	Income return	Capital return	Total return	
Short-term				
First four years	+7.7%	-0.4%	+7.4%	
Last two years	+6.5	+1.7	+8.2	
Total	+7.4%	+0.3%	+7.7%	
Intermediate-term				
First four years	+9.0%	-1.8%	+7.2%	
Last two years	+8.1	+2.7	+10.8	
Total	+8.7%	-0.3%	+8.4%	
Long-term				
First four years	+9.2%	-2.3%	+6.9%	
Last two years	+8.5	+3.9	+12.4	
Total	+9.0%	-0.3%	+8.7%	

TABLE 5-6Bond Funds—Annual Returns by Expense Level (Three Years EndedDecember 31, 1992)

		Funds with Expense Ratios				
Category	Average return	Less than 0.50%	0.50% to 1.00%	1.01% to 1.50%	Greater than 1.50%	Added return of low cost over high
Government						
Long-term	9.6%	10.6%	10.3%	9.4%	8.5%	+2.1%
Short-term	8.8	9.1	8.7	NA	8.1	+1.0
GNMA	10.5	11.0	10.5	9.9	9.8	+1.2
Corporate						
Long-term high-grade	10.2	10.6	10.1	10.0	8.4	+2.2
Long-term medium-grade	10.6	12.2	10.6	10.5	10.0	+2.2
Short-term high-grade	8.4	8.5	8.3	NA	NA	NA
Municipal						
Long-term AAA	8.8	9.6	9.1	8.1	7.8	+1.8
Long-term AA	8.9	9.6	9.1	8.2	7.8	+1.8
Long-term A	9.0	9.8	9.0	8.6	7.6	+2.2

TABLE 5–7High-Yield Bond Funds—Average Annual Total Returns (Six Years EndedDecember 31, 1992)

	Income return	Capital return	Total return	
First four years Last two years	+12.2% +12.4	-11.7% +15.5	+ 0.5% +27.9	
Full six years	+12.2%	- 3.3%	+ 8.9%	

TABLE 5-8High-Yield Bond Funds versus Investment-Grade Bond Funds—AverageAnnual Total Returns (Six Years Ended December 31, 1992)

<i>First Four Years</i> High-yield bond funds Investment-grade bond funds	+ 0.5% + 7.2
<i>Last Two Years</i> High-yield bond funds Investment-grade bond funds	+27.9% +10.8
<i>Full Six Years</i> High-yield bond funds Investment-grade bond funds	+ 8.9% +98.4

TABLE 6–1Money Market Mutual Funds (December 31, 1992)

Fund type	Number of funds	
Taxable		
Prime instruments*	363	
Federal agency notes	160	
U.S. Treasury bills	232	
Total taxable	655	
Tax-Exempt		
National municipal	169	
Single-state municipal	252	
Total tax-exempt	321	
Grand total	976	

*Commercial paper, certificates of deposit, and Eurodollar deposits.

FIGURE 6–1 Three-Month Certificates of Deposit—Quarterly Yields (1972–92)




FIGURE 6–2 Money Market Mutual Funds versus MMDAs—7-Day Yields (1983–92)




TABLE 6-2Money Market Fund Yields (December 31, 1992)


Money market fund	Percentage of assets rated Al/PI*	Gross yield	Expense ratio	Net yield
Higher quality	100%	3.53%	0.30%	3.23%
Lower quality	90	3.61	0.72	2.89

*Standard & Poor's and Moody's ratings only.

TABLE 6–3U.S. Treasury Money Market Funds (December 31, 1992)

Money fund	Annualized gross yield	Expense ratio	Annualized net yield
А	3.22%	0.30%	2.92%
В	3.17	0.37	2.80
С	3.23	0.46	2.77
D	3.19	0.55	2.64
Е	3.31	0.65	2.66
F	3.36	0.85	2.51

FIGURE 6–3 Taxable versus Municipal Money Market Funds—After-Tax 7-Day Yields



Note: Taxable money market yields are adjusted to reflect the prevailing maximum marginal tax rate.

TABLE 6-4Prime Money Market Funds—Average Total Return and Expense Ratio(December 31, 1992)

Expense ratio range	Number of funds	Average expense ratio	Average 1992 total return
Below 0.40%	12	0.24%	3.76%
0.40%-0.49%	9	0.45	3.61
0.50%-0.59%	39	0.54	3.45
0.60%-0.69%	36	0.65	3.41
0.70%-0.79%	40	0.75	3.30
0.80%-0.89%	31	0.84	3.14
0.90%-0.99%	20	0.95	3.07
1.00%-1.09%	18	1.02	2.99
1.10% and above	16	1.24	2.81

Only funds in existence for at least two years were included.

FIGURE 6-4 Short-Term Investment-Grade Bond Funds versus Money Market Funds—Cumulative Returns (1983–92)




TABLE 7–1 Portfolio Statistics Analysis—Balanced Funds (December 31, 1992)

Balanced fund	ExMark	Beta	Gross yield
Equity-oriented	87%	0.64	5.1%
Income-oriented	65	0.42	7.1
Asset allocation	75	0.53	4.8
S&P 500 Index	100%	1.00	2.8%

TABLE 7–2 Variations in Portfolio Characteristics of Balanced Funds

Balanced category	ExMark	Beta	Gross yield
Average equity-oriented fund	87%	0.64	5.1%
Conservative fund	92	0.57	6.2
Aggressive fund	84	0.81	4.4
Average income-oriented fund	65%	0.42	7.1%
Conservative fund	80	0.39	6.2
Aggressive fund	58	0.48	7.4
Average asset allocation fund	75%	0.53	4.8%
Conservative fund	93	0.52	5.3
Aggressive fund	55	0.94	3.5

TABLE 7-4Balanced Fund Relative Rankings by Decade

1982–92			1982–92		
Annual return*	Rank	1972–82 rank	Annual return*	Rank	1972–82 rank
+ 15.5%	1	15	+ 13.4%	9	3
+ 14.6	2	12	+ 13.1	10	1
+ 14.4	3	9	+ 12.7	11	4
+ 14.3	4	6	+ 12.6	12	8
+ 14.2	5	16	+ 12.3	13	7
+ 14.2	6	13	+ 12.2	14	14
+ 13.9	7	10	+ 12.2	15	2
+ 13.5	8	11	+ 11.8	16	5

*Excludes impact of sales charge.

TABLE 8–1Fund Expenses

Shareholder Transaction Expenses

Sales charge on purchases	5.00%
Sales charge on reinvested dividends	None
Redemption fees	None
Exchange fees	None

Annual Fund Operating Expenses

Management fees	0.89%
12b-1 distribution fees	None
Other operating expenses	0.31%
Total operating expenses	1.20%

The following example illustrates the expenses that you would incur on a 1,000 investment over various periods, assuming (1) a 5% annual return and (2) redemption at the end of each period.


1 Year	3 Years	5 Years	10 Years
\$62	\$87	\$115	\$197

TABLE 8–2Financial Highlights

	1992	1991	1990	1989	1988
Net asset value per share, beginning of period	\$19.18	\$13.27	\$14.44	\$11.14	\$10.31
Income from investment operations					
Net investment income Net gains or losses on securities (both realized and unrealized) Total from investment operations	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.15	0.15
	$\frac{-0.52}{-0.54}$	$\frac{7.40}{7.39}$	$\frac{-0.23}{-0.22}$	$\frac{3.35}{3.50}$	$\frac{0.83}{0.98}$
Less distributions					
Dividends (from net investment income) Distributions (from capital gains) Returns of capital Total distributions	$0.00 \\ -0.74 \\ \underline{0.00} \\ -0.74$	$0.00 \\ -1.48 \\ \frac{0.00}{-1.48}$	$0.00 \\ -0.95 \\ \underline{0.00} \\ -0.95$	-0.15 -0.05 -0.00 -0.20	-0.15 0.00 -0.15
Net asset value per share, end of period	\$17.90	\$19.18	\$13.27	\$14.44	\$11.14
Total return	-2.8%	+54.3%	+0.8%	+31.4%	+9.5%
Ratios/supplemental data					
Net assets, end of period (in millions) Ratio of expenses to average net assets Ratio of net income to average net assets Portfolio turnover rate	\$661.3 2.07% -0.82% 96%	\$546.6 2.28% -0.11% 147%	\$301.4 2.18% 0.54% 96%	\$298.1 2.21% 1.46% 112%	\$244.6 2.20% 0.81% 126%

Table must be shown for lesser of ten years or life of fund.

FIGURE 8–1 Morningstar Analysis—Bond Fund




Some Key Points:

- 1. Rating-Three stars (average).
- 2. Sales load of 4% on purchases.
- Sales charge reduces one-year return from -0.65% to -4.63%. Ten-year return reduced from 10.23% to 9.78%.
 Bets (10) close to that of the Lebraux Brothers Assessment Rond Judes' EvMark (56)
 - Beta (1.06) close to that of the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index; ExMark (56) aignificantly lower.
- 5. Solid annual rankings relative to municipal bond funds. No fourth quartile appearances.
- 6. Little capital gains realization in the past.
- 7. Gross income yield of 6.21% less expense ratio of 0.55% brings net income yield to 5.66%.
- 8. Net assets of \$1.226 billion.
- 9. Average weighted maturity of 20.6 years.

- 10. Low coupon consistent with holding some discount bonds.
- 11. Style matrix: medium quality, long-term maturity.
- Mix of top-tier and lower-tier investment-grade municipal bonds gives portfolio average quality rating of A.
- 13. Only 2 percent of long-term return consumed by taxes.
- 14. Tenured portfolio managers (since 1979 and 1982, respectively).
- Morningstar risk slightly higher, over time, as average municipal bond fund.
- Morningstar return similar to the average municipal bond fund.
 Ten-year average return -1.36% below the unmanaged Lehman Aggregate Bond Index.
- 18. Three-year return about the same as the Lehman Aggregate Bond Index.

FIGURE 8–2 Morningstar Analysis—Stock Fund



Some Key Points.

4

5.

- 1. Rating-Four stars (above average).
- No sales load.
 No total return adjustment necessary for fund without a sales commission

Nearly fully invested in equities (94.4%); cash 5.6%.
 About 12% of long comparison in the second secon

11. About 13% of long-term return lost to taxes. Fairly high potential tax liability (28%).

No sales charges or 12b-1 distribution fees.
 Portfolio management by committee.

- Risk level in line with S&P 500 Index (Beta 0.97); relatively low ExMark (R-squared) of 82.
- Solid annual rankings relative to Growth and Income funds. Only one fourth quartile appearance
- (1991).
- 6. Consistent and substantial capital gains distributions.
- Reasonably low expenses of 0.62% reduce gross income yield of 2.57% to a net income yield of 1.95%.
- 8. Net assets of \$464.9 billion.
- 9. Style matrix: large company, with a tilt towards value stocks.

- Morningstar risk about 15% below average equity mutual fund.
 Morningstar return in past 10 years 40% above average equity mutual fund.
 Fifteen-year average return +1.21% above the unmanaged S&P 500 Index.
- 17. Five-year average return +0.08% above the S&P 500 Index.
- 18. Portfolio price-earnings ratio of 21.9 times, 4% above S&P 500 Index.


TABLE 8–3The Morningstar Rating System

	Absolute Results		Relative Results (Base 1.00)			
	<i>Three-year</i> rate of return	Average shortfall	Reward	Risk	Score*	
Stock Fund A	+13.2%	-1.7%	1.15	1.00	1.15	
Stock Fund B Average stock fund	+ 9.2 +11.5%	-1.1 -1.7%	0.80 1.00	0.65 1.00	1.15 1.00	

*Reward + (1 - risk).

CAVEAT EMPTOR: The Coin-Flipping Contest

It is interesting, if not entirely fair, to compare the mutual fund performance derby that attracts so much press attention to a coin-flipping contest. In the contest, 100 persons begin flipping coins; at the end of ten flips, the most likely outcome is that 25 persons will have flipped five heads and five tails. The chances are virtually nil that anyone will flip either all heads or all tails. The upper chart illustrates the pattern of the expected outcome of the coin-flipping contest. The lower chart illustrates the actual outcome of the contest among equity fund managers for performance over the ten years ended December 31, 1992. The 100 largest growth and value fund managers had average annual gross returns of +15.6%. The table shows that 28 provided returns between +15% and +16%, 17 provided returns between +16% and +17%, and 21 provided returns between +14% and +15%, and so on. Three of the 100 managers defied the averages, as it were, two by earning returns of more than +20%, and one by earning a return of less than +11%. As you can see, the patterns are remarkably similar. A winning coin flipper commands no press interest; a winning fund manager is acclaimed a near genius.






FIGURE 9-1

Total Stock Market versus Average General Equity Mutual Fund and Average Equity Pension Fund—Cumulative Returns (1971–92)




TABLE 9–1 *Initial Investment of \$10,000* (December 31, 1970, to December 31, 1992)

Program	Rate of return	Final value
Total stock market	+12.0%	\$121,300
Average equity mutual fund	+10.8	95,500
Average pension equity fund	+10.8	95,500

FIGURE 9–2 *General Equity Funds Outperformed by the Wilshire 5000 (1971–92)*





FIGURE 9-3 Growth and Value Funds versus Total Stock Market (Ten Years Ended December 31, 1992)



CAVEAT EMPTOR: Indexing Pays Dividends

The focus on the yields available in the Growth and Value Indexes drives home yet again the importance of mutual fund operating expenses. The table below compares the actual yields on actively managed growth and value funds with those available from a respective index fund.

Growth Objective Value Objective Index fund Active fund Index fund Active fund Gross yield 2.1% 2.4% 3.7% 3.7% Expense ratio -0.2-1.4-0.2-1.3Net yield 1.9% 1.0% 3.5% 2.4%

Dividend Yields (December 31, 1992)

Note how the growth index fund, despite a lower gross yield than its counterpart active funds, provides, by reason of its low expenses, almost double the net yield. More importantly, note that the income from the value index fund is nearly 50% higher than for the active value funds. An investment of \$50,000 would provide annual income of \$1,200 for the active value funds, compared to \$1,750 for the value index fund. This extra income of \$550 per year comes without additional risk. If you are seeking retirement income, it is a compelling advantage.

TABLE 9–2 The Index Advantage—Annual Rate of Return (Ten Years Ended December 31, 1992)

	Mutual fund	Index*	Index advantage
Growth objective	+12.8%	+15.5%	+2.7%
Value objective	+13.6	+16.1	+2.5

*Reduced by 0.20% to account for assumed operating expenses incurred by an index fund.

FIGURE 9–4 Bond Funds versus Lehman Bond Index—Cumulative Returns (1983–92)




TABLE 9–3 *Initial Investment of \$10,000* (December 31, 1982, to December 31, 1992)

Program	Rate of return	Final value
Lehman Bond Index	+11.7%	\$30,270
Average bond fund	+10.2	26,300

TABLE 10–1 Mutual Fund Cost Analysis (Initial Investment of \$10,000)

Total Accumulations


Type of fund	Gross return	Expenses	Net return	One year	Ten years
Money market fund					
Low cost	+5.0%	0.3%	+4.7%	\$ 470	\$ 5,800
High cost	+5.0	1.0	+4.0	400	4,800
Bond fund					
Low cost	+8.0%	0.5%	+7.5%	\$ 750	\$10,600
High cost	+8.0	2.0	+6.0	600	7,900
Stock fund					
Low cost	+12.0%	0.6%	+11.4%	\$1,140	\$19,400
High cost	+12.0	2.5	+9.5	950	14,800

TABLE 10-2Contingent Deferred Sales Load

Year	Annual 12b-1 fee	Cumulative 12b-1 fee	Applicable exit fee	Cumulative sales load
1	1%	1%	5%	6%
2	1	2	4	6
3	1	3	3	6
4	1	4	2	6
5	1	5	1	6
6	1	6	0	6
7	1	7	0	7*
8	1	8	0	8*
9	1	9	0	9*
10	1	10	0	10*

*ln some funds, the maximum load is limited to 6%.

FIGURE 10–1 Distribution of Expense Ratios (1992)




1. Includes asset allocation and equity-oriented balanced funds.

2. Includes income-oriented balanced funds.

3. Excludes institutional money market funds.

FIGURE 10–2 Equity Fund Expense Ratios (1961–92)



CAVEAT EMPTOR: Another Kind of Expense Ratio

There are in fact two methods of calculating mutual fund expense ratios. One, almost universally accepted and the method I use in this chapter, is the ratio of fund expenses to average fund *assets*. The other, almost universally ignored, is the ratio of fund expenses to fund gross *income*. The latter ratio simply shows the percentage of your income that goes to fund management fees and operating expenses. These examples of the ratio of fund expenses to gross income are based on 1992 data:

	Per	cent of Asse	ts	Percent of gross income consumed
Fund category	Gross income	Expenses	Net income	by expenses
Stock funds	2.79%	1.50%	1.29%	54%
Balanced funds	5.35	1.27	4.08	24
Bond funds	8.75	1.07	7.68	12
Money market funds	3.48	0.62	2.86	18

Note that, even for the most income-oriented funds, expenses consume a substantial amount of your investment income. In this context, choosing between funds with high and low expense ratios makes an important difference in the amount of income you receive. This table shows the fund expense ratio analysis using the gross income yields shown above:

		L	ow Exper	ises	Hi	gher Expe	enses	
Fund type	Gross income	Expense ratio	Net income	Percent of income consumed	Expense ratio	Net income	Percent of income consumed	Increase in income in low- expense fund
Stock	2.79%	0.70%	2.09%	25%	2.00%	0.79%	72%	+165%
Balanced	5.35	0.60	4.75	11	1.50	3.85	28	+23
Bond Money	8.75	0.50	8.25	6	1.40	7.35	16	+12
market	3.48	0.40	3.08	11	1.00	2.48	29	+24

Particularly if you depend on investment income to help meet your retirement expenses, the table poses the question: "Why should you relinquish 30% of your income when perfectly good alternatives exist at a cost that consumes barely more than 10% of your income?" It is a rational question that demands a rational answer.

FIGURE 10–3 Annual Costs of Mutual Fund Ownership (Three-Year Holding Period Excludes Money Market Funds)




TABLE 11–1*Real After-Tax Returns (1926–92)*

	Nominal	Tax	After-tax	Inflation	After-tax
	return	impact	nominal return	impact	real return
Common stocks	+10.3%	-1.1%	+9.2%	-3.1%	+6.1%
Long-term bonds	+ 4.8	-1.2	+3.6	-3.1	+0.5
Cash reserves	+ 3.7	-0.9	+2.8	-3.1	-0.3

TABLE 11–2 Impact of Federal Taxes on Stock and Bond Returns

		Realiz	Stocks* ation of Capital	Gains
	Bonds	Annually (high) [†]	Tenth year (low) [†]	At death (zero) [†]
Pretax nominal return	+7.0%	+10.0%	+10.0%	+10.0%
Taxes on income	-2.3	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0
Taxes on capital gains	0.0	-2.0	-1.6	0.0
After-tax nominal return	+4.7%	+7.0%	+7.4%	+9.0%
Inflation rate	-3.0	-3.0	-3.0	-3.0
After-tax real return	+1.7%	+4.0%	+4.4%	+6.0%
Pretax real return	+4.0%	+7.0%	+7.0%	+7.0%
Taxes as percent of real return	58%	43%	36%	14%

*Dividend yield of 3%; capital growth of +7%. Table assumes a 33% marginal tax rate for income and 28% for capital gains. *Rate of portfolio turnover.

TABLE 11–3 Final Value of Initial Investment of \$10,000 (Ten-year period)

		Real	Stocks* ization of Capital C	Fains
	Bonds	Annually (high) [†]	Tenth year (low) [†]	At death (zero) [†]
Pretax nominal value	\$19,670	\$25,940	\$25,940	\$25,940
After-tax real value	11,840	14,800	15,380	17,910
*Same assumptions as Table	11-2			

*Same assumptions as Table 11–2. *Rate of portfolio turnover.

TABLE 11–4 Impact of Taxes on Capital Returns (Ten Years Ended December 31, 1992)

	Fund A	Fund B	Fund C
Percent of gains realized	96%	41%	13%
A. Before taxes			
Initial investment	\$10,000	\$10,000	\$10,000
Capital gains distributions	18,211	7,830	2,450
Unrealized capital gains	850	11,070	16,460
Increase in value	\$19,061	\$18,900	\$18,900
Final before-tax value	\$29,061	\$28,900	\$28,900
B. After taxes			
Initial investment	\$10,000	\$10,000	\$10,000
Capital gains distributions	\$15,834	\$7,288	\$2,411
Tax on distributions (28%)	-4,434	-2,041	-675
Unrealized capital gains	660	10,488	16,132
Increase in value	\$12,060	\$15,735	\$17,868
Final after-tax value	\$22,060	\$25,735	\$27,868
Rate of capital return			
Before taxes	+11.3%	+11.2%	+11.2%
After taxes	+ 8.2	+ 9.9	+10.8

TABLE 11–5 Impact of Taxes on Capital Returns (Ten Years Ended December 31, 1992)

	Fund A	Fund B	Fund C
Percent of gains realized	96%	41%	13%
Final after-tax value (before sale)	\$22,060	\$25,735	\$27,868
Unrealized capital gains	660	10,488	16,132
Tax liability (28%)	-185	-2,936	-4,516
Final after-tax value (after sale)	\$21,875	\$22,799	\$23,352
Rate of capital return	+8.1%	+8.6%	+8.9%

TABLE 11-6 Annual Portfolio Turnover of Common Stock Funds (1992)*

Annual rate of portfolio turnover	Number of funds
Under 25%	114
25% to 50%	112
51% to 75%	85
76% to 100%	62
101% to 150%	61
More than 150%	61
Total funds	495

*Includes common stock funds with assets greater than \$100 million.

TABLE 11–7 Mutual Fund Portfolio Turnover (Ten Years Ended December 31, 1992)

	Annual portfolio	Percent of Capital Return		
Level of turnover	turnover rate	Unrealized	Realized	
Low (under 25%)	16%	67%	33%	
Below average (25%–50%)	36	53	47	
Average (51%–100%)	66	22	78	
Above average (more than 100%)	150	18	82	

TABLE 11–8 Impact of Taxes on Total Returns (10 Years Ended December 31, 1992)

	Pretax total return	After-tax total return	After-tax value of \$10,000 initial investment
Fund A	+12.2%	+11.1%	\$28,580
Fund B	+12.3	+ 9.6	25,080

. .

TABLE 11–9Taxable versus Tax-Deferred Investment Programs (Annual Investments of \$5,000)

Value at end		Total Accumulations*	
of year	Taxable account	Tax-deferred $accounts^{\dagger}$	Tax-deferred accounts [‡]
10	\$ 48,690	\$ 58,800	\$ 87,760
15	87,770	117,080	174,750
20	141,820	211,060	315,010
25	216,580	362,410	540,910
30	319,960	606,160	904,720

*Assumes +10% annual rate of return and a 33% tax rate applied to the annual investments in the taxable account and to its entire annual return.

[†]Net of taxes payable on withdrawal from tax-deferred account at the end of each period.

[‡]Assumes no withdrawal from tax-deferred account at the end of each period.

TABLE 11–10 Variable Annuity Fund versus Taxable Mutual Fund* (\$50,000 Initial Investment)

Value at end of year	Taxable mutual fund	Tax-deferred variable annuity [†]	Tax-deferred variable annuity [‡]
10	\$ 89,800	\$105,470	\$ 87,170
15	120,340	153,190	119,140
20	161,270	222,490	165,570
25	216,120	323,150	233,010
30	289,620	469,340	330,960

*Assumes +10% average annual gross return, 33% tax rate, and annual expenses of 1% for the taxable fund and 2.25% for the variable annuity fund.

- [†]Assumes no withdrawal from annuity at the end of each period.
- [‡]Net of taxes payable on withdrawal from annuity at the end of each period.

TABLE 11–11 Variable Annuity Cost Comparison (\$50,000 Initial Investment)*

Value at end of year	Average-cost variable annuity	Low-cost variable annuity
10	\$105,470	\$115,680
15	153,190	175,960
20	222,490	267,640
25	323,150	407,100
30	469,340	619,220

*Based on +10% annual return, reduced by costs of 2.25% and 1.25%, respectively. Assumes no withdrawals from either account.

TABLE 11–12Tax Impact on Various Yields

Taxable yield	4.0%	5.0%	6.0%	7.0%	8.0%	9.0%	10.0%
Less federal taxes*	1.3	1.6	2.0	2.3	2.6	3.0	3.3
Required tax-exempt yield	2.7%	3.4%	4.0%	4.7%	5.4%	6.0%	6.7%

*Assumes 33% marginal tax rate.

TABLE 11–13 Impact of Higher Tax Rates on Tax-Exempt Yields

Marginal federal tax rate	Tax-exempt yield	Equivalent taxable yield
25%	6.0%	8.0%
30	6.0	8.6
35	6.0	9.2
40	6.0	10.0

TABLE 11–14 Impact of Taxes on Corporate and Treasury Instruments

	Taxable money market fund	Taxable long-term bond fund
Corporate obligation		
Pretax yield	4.0%	7.0%
Federal taxes (33%)	-1.3	-2.3
After-tax yield	2.7%	4.7%
State and local taxes*	-0.2	-0.3
After-tax yield	2.5%	4.4%
U.S. Treasury obligation		
Pretax yield	3.5%	6.5%
Federal taxes (33%)	-1.2	-2.1
After-tax yield	2.3%	4.4%

*Assumes a marginal state tax rate of 6%, net of the federal tax deduction for state and local taxes.

FIGURE 12–1 Basic Asset Allocation Model (Stocks/Bonds)




TABLE 12–1 50/50 Stock/Bond Allocation (25 Years Ended December 31, 1992)*

	Ace	cumulat	ion Invest	or		Dist	ribution In	westor	
	Cur	nulative	e Total Val	ие	Си	umulative C	Capital Val	lue	Cumulative Income
Time span		Bonds (+7%)	Total portfolio		Stocks (+7%)	Bonds (0)	Total portfolio	Stock ratio	
Inception	\$ 100	\$100	\$ 200	50%	\$100	\$100	\$200	50%	\$ 0
5 years	161	140	301	53	140	100	240	58	53
10 years	259	197	456	57	197	100	297	66	114
15 years	418	276	694	60	276	100	376	73	186
20 years	673	387	1,060	63	387	100	487	79	272
25 years	1,083	543	1,626	67	543	100	643	84	378

*No rebalancing of portfolio. Initial investment of \$100 in both stocks and bonds.

TABLE 12–2 50/50 Initial Stock/Bond Allocation (25 Years Ended December 31, 1992)

Time span	Portfolio Value at End of Each Period			
	Fixed-ratio program	Variable-ratio program		
Inception	\$ 10,000	\$10,000		
5 years	13,570	13,540		
10 years	15,830	15,410		
15 years	25,990	24,850		
20 years	52,040	49,950		
25 years	100,590	97,910		

Stock returns are based on the S&P 500 Index; bond returns are based on long-term U.S. government bonds. Initial investment of \$10,000 in each program.

TABLE 12–3Stock/Bond Allocation (%)

Basic allocation	Maximum aggressive allocation	Maximum conservative allocation
50/50	65/35	35/65
60/40	75/25	45/55
70/30	85/15	55/45
80/20	95/5	65/35

TABLE 12-4Impact of a Changing Price-Dividend Ratio

Price Paid for \$1 of Dividends		Implied Percentage Change in Market Value	
Initial	25-year average	Instantaneous	Spread over 10 years
\$40*	\$27	- 33%	- 3.9%
35	27	- 23	- 2.6
30	27	- 10	- 1.0
25	27	+ 8	+ 0.8
20	27	+ 35	+ 3.0
15	27	+ 80	+ 6.1
10*	27	+170	+10.4

*These extreme valuations were reached, respectively, only at the 1987 market high and the 1933 market low.

FIGURE 12–2 Forecast Returns versus Actual Returns—Stocks and Bonds




TABLE 12–5Stock Returns (Decades Ending 1935–92)

Initial yield	Chances of return greater than +10% over subsequent decade	
Less than 3.5%	1 in 16	
3.5% to 4.5%	7 in 15	
4.6% to 6.0%	13 in 17	
More than 6.0%	6 in 10	
Total	27 in 58*	

*Out of 58 ten-year periods, 27 had average returns greater than +10%.

TABLE 12–6 Long-Term U.S. Government Bond Returns (Decades Ending 1935–92)

Future returns versus initial yield	Chances of occurrence	
Within 1.5%	34 in 58	
1.5% to 2.0%	13 in 58	
2.1% to 2.5%	8 in 58	
Greater than 2.5%	3 in 58	

TABLE 12–7 The Relationship between Cost and Quality

U.S. Treasury bond fund	BBB quality bond fund
-------------------------	-----------------------

Assumed gross yield	7.0%	8.2%
Assumed annual cost	0.3	2.3
Yield to investor	6.7%	5.9%

TABLE 12–8 Sample Asset Allocation Portfolios (Stocks/Bonds)

	Balanced Risk		Risk Averse
	Actively managed funds 50/50	Index funds 50/50	Index funds 35/65
Weighted portfolio return	+8.5%	+8.5%	+8.1%
Assumed cost Net portfolio return	$\frac{-2.0}{+6.5\%}$	$\frac{-0.2}{+8.3\%}$	$\frac{-0.2}{+7.9\%}$

Return of +10% on stocks and +7% on bonds.

TABLE 12–9 Sample Asset Allocation Portfolios (Stocks/Bonds)

	Balanced Risk		Risk Averse
	Actively managed funds 50/50	Index funds 50/50	Index funds 35/65
Weighted portfolio return	+9.5%	+9.5%	+8.8%
Assumed cost Net portfolio return	$\frac{-1.0}{+8.5\%}$	$\frac{-0.2}{+9.3\%}$	$\frac{-0.2}{+8.6\%}$

Return of +12% on stocks and +7% on bonds.

TABLE 13–1Model Portfolio Allocations

	Type of Investor							
			Distribution		Lump Sum		Institution	
	Accumulation	Transition			Growth- oriented		Pension	Endowmen
Stock funds								
Growth	35%	15%	0%	0%	35%	15%	15%	10%
Value	30	30	25	15	20	25	15	25
Equity income	0	15	25	20	0	20	15	25
Specialty	15	5	0	0	15	0	15	0
Total stock funds	80%	65%	50%	35%	70%	60%	60%	60%
Bond funds								
Long term	10%	10%	20%	30%	20%	25%	20%	20%
Intermediate term	10	15	20	25	10	10	10	20
Short term	0	10	10	10	0	5	10	0
Total bond funds	20%	35%	50%	65%	30%	40%	40%	40%
Total portfolio	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 13–2Accumulating Investment Assets

Number of years	Monthly investment required to accumulate \$100,000	
30	\$ 44	
20	131	
10	484	
5	1,281	

Assumes an annual return of +10%.

FIGURE 13–1 The Accumulation Investor




FIGURE 13–2 The Transition Investor




TABLE 13–3The Impact of Inflation on an Investment Portfolio

Year	Inflation-adjusted value
Inception	\$100,000
5	85,870
10	73,740
15	63,330
20	54,380
25	46,700

Assumes 7% income return and 3% rate of inflation. All distributions received in cash.

CAVEAT EMPTOR: Looking for More Income?

Despite logic and historical evidence, reasonable persons can disagree that the total returns achieved by a passive stock market index fund will outpace the total returns achieved by most traditional professional advisers. However, there can be no debate about the fact that, when risk is held constant, an index fund will provide a higher current income return, solely by reason of its lower cost. Similarly, a low-cost stock fund and a low-cost bond fund will provide higher income returns than their high-cost counterparts. The magnitude of the income differences may be large, as indicated by the examples in this table.

Impact of Costs on Income—Distribution Investor (*Early Retirement Years*)

	Portfolio allocation	Assumed gross yield	Net income after annual expenses	
			0.30%	1.50%
Value stock fund	25%	4.0%	3.7%	2.5%
Equity income fund	25	5.0	4.7	3.5
Long-term bond fund	20	7.0	6.7	5.5
Intermediate-term bond fund	20	6.0	5.7	4.5
Short-term bond fund	10	5.0	4.7	3.5
Total (weighted)	100%	5.4%	5.1%	3.9%

Given a choice between a yield of 5.1% or 3.9% in two substantially identical portfolios, any intelligent investor would make the sensible selection. For an investor with \$100,000 of capital, opting for annual income of \$5,100 rather than \$3,900—an increase of more than 30%—without any increase whatsoever in risk exposure should not be a difficult decision. So for the distribution investor, the income-oriented lump-sum investor, and the endowment fund, it seems almost beyond argument that a significant portion of assets should be invested in stock funds and bond funds (including index funds) with minimal costs and no sales commissions.

FIGURE 13–3 The Distribution Investor





FIGURE 13–4 The Lump-Sum Investor



CAVEAT EMPTOR: Compared to What?

It is conventional wisdom that an investor should *never* dip into principal. Broadly speaking, that is sound policy. Yet circumstances may arise under which you will need additional spendable resources. In my view, spending principal is often better than increasing the yield on the account. For example, assume that you hold a \$100,000 portfolio and need an additional \$1,000 cash during the coming year. Withdrawing it would simply reduce the capital value of your account to \$99,000. On the other hand, increasing the portfolio yield to earn the additional \$1,000, would require a significant change in the very nature of the investment portfolio, as this table shows.

		Current		Required	
Asset	Amount	Yield	Income	Yield	Income
Bonds	\$ 50,000	7.0%	\$3,500	9.0%	\$4,500
Stocks	50,000	3.0	1,500	3.0	1,500
Total	\$100,000	5.0%	\$5,000	6.0%	\$6,000

Increasing Yield by Lowering Bond Quality

For simplicity, I have assumed that the additional income is earned by changing the bond position only, increasing the yield from 7% to 9%. That would mean, essentially, liquidating an all-U.S. Treasury bond fund position and investing the proceeds in a portfolio equally divided between BBB and BB bond funds. Such a reduction in quality, especially for investors who can't afford to incur any credit risk, is beyond the bounds of prudence. So, compared to downgrading the quality of the entire portfolio, occasionally spending moderate amounts of principal makes sense.

FIGURE 13–5 The Pension Fund




FIGURE 13–6 The Endowment Fund




TABLE 13-4*Mutual Fund Gross Yields* (December 31, 1992)

Stock F	unds	Bond Fu	nds
Fund type	Gross yield	Fund type	Gross yield
Growth	2.3%	Long term	7.3%
Value	3.7	Intermediate term	6.7
Equity income	5.0	Short term	4.8
Specialty	1.5		

TABLE 14–1 Management Company Profit Margins

	Before fee increase	After fee increase
Management fees	\$5,369,000	\$7,055,000
Operating expenses	823,000	823,000
Operating profit	\$4,546,000	\$6,232,000
Profit margin	85%	88%

CAVEAT EMPTOR: The What-If Portfolio

In considering the division of economies of scale between mutual funds and their management companies, let's contrast the investment returns on the stocks of mutual fund management companies with those of the funds that they manage. It has been much more profitable to own shares in the managers than to own shares in their funds. One outstanding mutual fund manager, describing "one of my favorite what-if portfolios," recently wrote that "in a single year (1989), if you had divided your money equally among eight (management company) stocks, you would have outperformed 99% of the funds that these companies promote." The long-run record appears far more imposing than that. This table compares the results of investing \$10,000, equally weighted, in the shares of the two largest publicly traded management companies during the decade ended December 31, 1992, with the returns of their equity funds and the unmanaged Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index.

Total Return (Ten Years Ended December 31, 1992)

	Final value of \$10,000 investment	Annual rate of return
Management companies	\$1,590,600	+65.9%
Equity funds managed	35,500	+13.6
S&P 500 Index	44,800	+16.2

At least over this time period, during which the mutual fund industry grew so substantially, the profitability of these advisers has been completely disproportionate to the returns of the funds they manage. Ironically, these two managers have enjoyed this enormous growth despite the fact that the aggregate performance of their managed equity funds fell far short of the performance of the unmanaged S&P 500 Index. (Incidentally, I am not recommending investments in management company stocks, in part because I see a new era of intense price competition ahead.)